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Max Headroom: Discretionary Capital Buffers and Bank Risk
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the association between discretionary capital buffers, capital requirements,
and risk for European banks. The discretionary buffers are banks’ own buffers, or headroom: the
difference between reported and required capital. I exploit capital requirements data that banks
started to disclose since the release of a 2015 European Banking Authority opinion. Results using
detailed SREP and Pillar 2 data of the largest 99 European banks over 2013-2019 show that less
headroom is associated with increased bank risk. An additional examination reveals a positive
association between headroom and stress test results for banks subjected to the Single Supervisory
Mechanism, a result that runs against supervisory requirements.
JEL classification: E58, G21, G32, M41.
Keywords: Banking, European Banks, Pillar 2 requirements, SREP.
1. Introduction
Banks have significantly raised capital ratios since the onset of Global Financial Crisis. Com-
mon Equity Tier 1 ratios for large internationally operating banks are now close to 13 percent,
which is significantly higher than a decade ago (BCBS, 2019a). Since 2011, European banks have
doubled CET1 ratios to over 14 percent (EBA, 2012, 2019a).
Although the increase in bank capital ratios is an important result of regulatory initiatives since
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), they are not fully determined by formal capital requirements.
For European banks in particular, a significant part of the increase in capital is the result of the
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process, or SREP (ECB, 2018). SREP capital requirements
are jointly determined by the bank and its supervisor and add a layer of capital requirements over
the primary, Pillar 1, capital requirements. SREP capital, also known as Pillar 2 capital, covers
risks not covered by Pillar 1, which covers only credit risk, market risk, and operational risk.
Since 2015, European banks started disclosing Pillar 2 and SREP requirements, which is un-
precedented. Before 2015 and outside Europe, banks and supervisors have kept (and still keep)
these buffers out of the public eye. Access to these requirements allows me to better assess the true
capital requirements.
Using a unique set of hand-collected Pillar 2 and SREP data from European banks for the
years 2013-2019, I document a negative association between discretionary capital buffers and non-
discretionary, or required bank capital: increases in the latter go at the expense of the former. This
negative association could just indicate that an increase of required capital captures all relevant
bank risks, i.e. that bank-specific risks (which should drive the discretionary buffers) diminish
when required capital increases. To assess if that is the case, I examine the association between
discretionary bank buffers (or banks’ own buffers, headroom) and bank risk. My results then show
that diminished discretionary bank capital is associated with elevated risk. Yields on contingent
convertible capital instruments (CoCos, or Additional Tier 1 capital), densities (the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets), and the response to the March 2020 COVID-19 share price crash
increase with declining levels of discretionary capital, while Z-scores decrease. These results hold,
even after controlling for non-discretionary, required bank capital.
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An additional examination of European banks’ responses to stress tests reveals a positive as-
sociation between discretionary buffers and stress test results, that is, for banks that are subjected
to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). SSM banks that perform poorly in EBA stress tests
lower their discretionary buffers in post-stress test years, whereas supervisory guidance requires
banks to use the stress test results to set, arguably strengthen, discretionary bank capital buffers.
The positive association between discretionary buffers and stress test results is particularly strong
for SSM banks during later sample years.
In all, my results document that discretionary buffers give way to formal, required buffers. The
increase in required buffers lowers banks’ discretionary (own) buffers or ‘headroom’. The loss of
headroom is associated with risk. The results of the stress test analysis then shows that the loss of
headroom negatively affects risk mitigation. Consequently, my paper shows further limits of the
effectiveness of bank capital requirements.
This study contributes to a growing literature that critically examines the effects of the post-
GFC bank regulation. Against a backdrop of research that advocates high capital ratios, see for
example Admati et al. (2016), I examine bank-specific capital ratio requirements in relation to
bank risk. The results show that lower discretionary buffers are associated with higher risk, even
controlling for non-discretionary bank capital requirements.
I extend work of Gropp et al. (2016), Dautovic¸ (2019) and Goel et al. (2019), who document
consequences of higher capital ratios in a post-GFC era. For example, I document how banks’ dis-
cretionary buffers interact with capital requirements. I also contribute to research that demonstrates
the diminishing effectiveness of capital requirements once banks achieve a certain capitalisation
(BCBS, 2019b, Arnould et al., 2020). With access to data covering the years following the entry
into force of Basel III, I extend work of EBA’s Melis and Weissenberg (2019), who find no evid-
ence of a link between bank characteristics and discretionary capital buffers. My evidence does
show such evidence.
My results also contribute to the literature on stress testing (Acharya et al., 2014, Steffen,
2014), in that I document how European banks respond to stress test results. Instead of using stress
test results to augment discretionary buffers, as prescribed and proposed by the EBA (EBA, 2018,
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2020), my results show that a significant number of banks that perform poorly in EBA stress tests
fail to augment discretionary buffers, whereas one would expect a more prudent response from
these banks.
My results are policy relevant. More than then a decade after the onset of GFC, regulators
are calling for an increase in capital requirements (de Guindos, 2019, Brainard, 2019), while at
the same time the gap between required and actual capital ratios are falling (EBA, 2019b, World
Bank, 2019). Moreover, policy makers have started noticing that bank buffers serve conflicting
interests: from a macro-prudential point of view there may be a need to draw down buffers in an
economic downturn, whereas from a micro-economic, bank-specific, point of view such a drawing
down is not warranted (Pablo Herna´ndez de Cos, 2019). In addition, my data confirms existing
studies on the poor performance of European banks (e.g. EBA (2019b)), while at the same time
bank capital requirements have increased. These developments raise questions about the relevance
of discretionary bank buffers (Pillar 2 and SREP), which this paper attempts to answer.
2. Literature
2.1. Bank capital
The recent literature covering bank capital predominantly focuses on levels of capital, albeit
that views on the benefits and costs of bank capital vary. WhereMehran and Thakor (2011), Admati
et al. (2016), Admati et al. (2017), Berger and Bouwman (2013), Thakor (2014), and Gambacorta
and Shin (2016) highlight the benefits of high levels of bank capital, others express a more mod-
erate position (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2001, Kashyap et al., 2008, DeAngelo and Stulz, 2013).
The documented benefits of bank capital are: improved ability to survive and gain market share
(Berger and Bouwman, 2013, Liu et al., 2013, BCBS, 2018), lending and debt funding (Bolton
et al., 2016, Gambacorta and Shin, 2018), liquidity (Berger and Bouwman, 2009), market value
(Mehran and Thakor, 2011), and higher GDP (Brooke et al., 2015, Homar and van Wijnbergen,
2017).
Views on how high capital requirements should be vary. Firestone et al. (2017) show that
optimal capital ratios are between 13-25 percent of Risk-weighted assets. BCBS (2010) finds a op-
timal range of 9-15 percent, and the Minneapolis FED asserts that a minimum capital requirement
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of about 22 percent maximizes net benefits (FED Minneapolis, 2017). Other studies, however,
confirm that the marginal benefits of higher capital are positive, but decline monotonically (Al-
menberg et al., 2017, Cline, 2010, Fender and Lewrick, 2016). Research by the Basel Committee
confirms this view: according to BCBS (2019b), the net marginal benefits of adding more capital
are positive, but approach zero once banks meet a capital ratio of about twelve percent.
It should be noticed that there is only so much than bank capital can do. For example, there is
no compelling evidence that confirms bank capital requirements can help prevent financial crises
(Jorda` et al., 2017, BCBS, 2019b). Dautovic¸ (2019) finds that higher capital may induce risk
taking. Lastly, Arnould et al. (2020) document a convex relation between capital ratios and funding
costs, with senior bond rates reaching a minimum around CET1 ratios of about 11 percent: higher
capital ratios have downsides as well.
While the higher, post-GFC, capital ratios undoubtedly have important benefits, the transition
to these higher capital requirements is not necessarily unproblematic. Gropp et al. (2016) find
that European banks, confronted with a sudden increase in capital requirements reduced lending.
This instead of raising equity levels. De Marco and Wieladek (2016) shows that SME lending is
sensitive to capital requirements increases. De Jonghe et al. (2019) and Jensen (2015) confirm
these results for bank-specific capital requirements. Bahaj et al. (2018) complement these studies
and show that lending is likely to be more sensitive to changes in capital requirements in times of
weak credit growth. Confirming Gropp et al. and others, Kashyap et al. (2010) note that reduced
lending by banks leads to a migration of business to shadow banks.
Regarding banks’ funding decisions in response to higher capital requirements, Lubberink and
Renders (2018) and Valle´e (2019) show that during the lead-up to the implementation of Basel III,
poorly capitalised banks engaged in Liability Management Exercises to bolster their Core Tier 1
ratios, which was at the expense of the banks’ liquidity and Total Capital ratios and led to wealth
transfers from owner to debt-holders.
Surprisingly little has been written about discretionary bank buffers. For example, Barth et al.
(2005) mention these buffers in passing, see their figures 3.6 and 3.8. Mathur (2019) examines
bank buffers in the context of policy uncertainty and finds that banks facing more policy uncertainty
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have larger discretionary buffers. However, Mathur examines only UK banks. EBA’s Melis and
Weissenberg (2019) examine a larger sample: they cover European banks. Their data, however,
is largely restricted to the third quarter of 2017. Nevertheless, their conclusions are relevant for
my study: Melis and Weissenberg examine the link between discretionary bank buffers and risk
taking. Unlike me, they do not find evidence to support the existence of such a link. Neither
do they empirically link discretionary bank buffers to stress testing, a link that has become more
relevant for European banks since June 2016, see Section 2.2 below.
The sparse research on discretionary bank buffers then prompts the question whether these
buffers are relevant. For example, can the results of Melis and Weissenberg and Mathur be gen-
eralised for a longer time period and for other countries? Can these buffers be associated with
characteristics such as bank risk? Do banks increase these buffers to mitigate risks?
Using unique, hand-collected data of the composition of bank capital from the 99 largest
European banks over 2013-2019, I document a negative association between discretionary cap-
ital buffers and non-discretionary, or required, bank capital. This negative association could just
mean that an increase of non-discretionary capital sufficiently captures risks that were not cap-
tured without the increase. The increase in non-discretionary capital would thus offset the decline
of discretionary capital, without making a bank more or less risky. To assess if that is the case, I
examine the association between discretionary bank buffers and bank risk. My results then show
that diminished discretionary bank capital is associated with elevated risk: yields on contingent
convertible capital instruments (CoCos, or Additional Tier 1 capital) increase with declining levels
of discretionary capital. Densities (the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets) increase as
well, while Z-scores decrease. Evidence from the March 2020 COVID-19 price crash shows that
the price drop is significantly stronger for banks with low discretionary capital.
These results hold, even after controlling for non-discretionary, required bank capital.
An examination of banks’ responses to EBA stress test results shows that European banks
subjected to the SSM which perform well (poorly) in these tests increase (decrease) discretionary
bank capital, whereas European regulators arguably expect poorly performing banks to augment
capital, not deplete it.
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2.2. Regulatory Capital in Europe
This section explains how various capital buffers are positioned in the overall EU capital frame-
work. Figure 1 shows an overview of the European bank capital framework, that is, for banks sub-
jected to the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR, EC, 2013b) and the Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD, EC, 2013a). The left bar shows regulatory values under the EU’s implementation
of Basel III, the CRR and CRD. The bar at the right shows actual average values for 2018.
[Figure 1 about here]
The primary Basel III capital requirements are 4.5 percent of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)
over Risk-weighted assets (RWA) plus 1.5 percent Additional Tier 1 and 2 percent Tier 2 capital.
These are Pillar 1 capital requirements, which should cover Credit Risk, Market Risk, and Oper-
ational Risk. On top of these Pillar 1 requirements are three buffer requirements, denoted with
an asterisk: a 2.5 percent capital conservation buffer, a counter-cyclical buffer that is limited to
2.5 percent of RWA and a 1 to 5 percent capital surcharge for systematically important banks (SIB
buffers). I use shades of green to highlight requirements that should be met with common equity
capital.1,2
The total CRR common equity requirement can thus stack up to 14.5 percent. Total Capital
requirements, ignoring Pillar 2, can stack up to 18 percent because of the inclusion of subor-
dinated debt: Additional Tier 1, or CoCos, and Tier 2 for 1.5 and 2 percent of Risk-weighted
assets respectively.
2.2.1. Pillar 2 Guidance and Pillar 2 Required
On top of the Pillar 1 requirements, European banks should also satisfy Pillar 2 requirements.
These cover risks other than those covered by Pillar 1, for example reputational risk and concen-
tration risk.
1Under CRR (EC, 2013b), Pillar 2R can be met with 75 percent common equity. However, my research focuses
on capital of the highest quality only, i.e. CET1.
2CRR-II Article 104a 4 relaxes the full equity requirement for the combined buffer requirement, which shall be
met by at least 75 percent common equity. CRR-II will not affect my results, as it enters into force in 2019.
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Pillar 2 requirements are generally set in the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (ECB,
2018). This process, also known as SREP, is a dialog between the supervisor and the bank, where
both agree on a capital level that covers all relevant risks. The SREP capital requirement is bank-
specific. Figure 1 and Table 1 show that SREP capital typically exceeds 2 percent of Risk-weighted
assets.
Traditionally, Pillar 2 requirements are unobservable. However, in December 2015, the European
Banking Authority published an opinion that required banks to disclose the SREP results, includ-
ing the composition of any additional capital requirements (EBA, 2015). This was novel: Pillar 2
and SREP results are traditionally kept out of the public eye.
Banks responded positively to the EBA opinion: about 65 percent of the sample banks disclosed
SREP requirements in 2015. Figure 3 Panel 3 and Table 1 show that disclosed SREP requirements
for 2015 were the highest of all years.
The initiative to require banks to publish the SREP results, however, was short-lived. In Feb-
ruary 2016, investors grew nervous about Deutsche Bank. Aware of its e6.7bn loss for fiscal year
2015 and the EBA opinion of that year’s December, they worried about Deutsche Bank’s ability
to pay coupons on Additional Tier 1 instruments (Shotter, 2016). On February 8, 2016, the bank,
prompted by market developments, announced that it was able to pay AT1 coupons of approxim-
ately e0.35 billion. Unfortunately, this announcement rattled the markets. The day after, Deutsche
Bank’s AT1 securities (CoCos) traded at 70-75 cents on the dollar, down from 93 cents at the start
of the year (Deutsche Bank, 2016, Cotterill, 2016).
Shortly after the events of February 2016, the European Commission decided to split Pillar 2
capital into two elements: a guidance part (P2G) and a requirements part, or P2R (Glover, 2016).
Where Pillar 1 and P2R are “hard” requirements that banks should always meet, the Pillar 2 Guid-
ance part (P2G) is a “soft” buffer. A bank that dips into this buffer will prompt the supervisor’s
attention, but actions will be focused on increasing capital in a discrete and bespoke way. Investors
and depositors will not necessarily know.
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2.2.2. The Maximum Distributable Amount
Banks that do not meet the combined buffer requirements, the 4.5 percent CET1 capital require-
ment, and P2R will not be allowed make distributions such as dividends, bonuses, and coupons on
some debt instruments. These banks are then required to satisfy rules governing the ‘Maximum
Distributable Amount’ or MDA (EC, 2013a, Article 142). Consequently, banks face a hard capital
requirement being the sum of the combined buffer requirements, the 4.5 percent CET1 base capital
requirement, and P2R.
2.2.3. Pillar 2 and EBA stress testing
In June 2016, European bank regulators decided to exempt the Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) from
EBA stress test results and the MDA calculations. According to Danie`lle Nouy, then Chair of the
Supervisory Board at the ECB: “Only the requirements are MDA-relevant, not the guidance, be-
cause there is no automaticity with transforming the guidance into a requirement. . . . The outcomes
of the stress test are expected to be in the guidance. They will not be MDA-relevant.” (Henry,
2016). EBA guidelines on SREP and stress testing confirm that competent authorities should de-
termine and set P2G based on the outcomes of the adverse scenario of the relevant supervisory
stress tests (EBA, 2018, 2020).
2.2.4. The SREP letter and the AT1 & Tier 2 shortfall
After the publication of EBA (2015), banks started reporting on Pillar 2 and SREP require-
ments more systematically. Unicredit’s annual report of 2015, for example, explicitly mentions the
requirements: “the European Central Bank (ECB) set the following capital requirements for Uni-
Credit on a consolidated basis: 9.5% CET1 (transitional).” Criteria Caixa (Spain) mentions in its
2015 annual report: “The European Central Bank (ECB) issued Criteria the minimum regulatory
capital requirements after analysing the results of the supervisory review and evaluation process
(SREP), which requires maintaining a regulatory CET1 ratio of 9.25%.”
By fiscal 2018, except for seven, all banks report Pillar 2 or SREP requirements, often referring
to the SREP letter received from the ECB. By 2019, many banks disclose the ECB SREP letter
requirements in press releases.
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From 2018 on, banks cannot count as CET1 capital any shortfalls of Additional Tier 1 and
Tier 2 capital (ECB, 2018). This shortfall affects the discretionary buffer by 1.14 percent.
2.2.5. Pillar 2 disclosure requirements
Regarding the disclosure of Pillar 2 or SREP requirements, banks are free to disclose them in
full, be it P2R or P2G. A reason to disclose these requirements, including P2G requirements, is
that the market conduct regulator may regard this information as price-sensitive, and hence wants
banks to disclose. Nine sample banks do report P2G data: OP Financial group (Finland), Banca
Monte dei Paschi, Banca Carige, and Iccrea Banca (Italy), Raiffeisen Bank International, BAWAG
(Austria) and Belgian banks KBC, Belfius, and Dexia.
2.3. Research questions
The sections above prompt various questions on discretionary bank capital buffers. These are
i)whether these capital buffers are associated with bank characteristics, given that Melis and Weis-
senberg (2019) find no relation based on their sample, ii) whether these capital buffers are relevant.
For example, Dautovic¸ (2019) shows a link between capital levels and bank risk, iii)whether banks
use stress test outcomes to build discretionary bank capital buffers, this to mitigate risks going for-
ward.
I focus on bank risk and risk mitigation. The reason is that SREP capital requirements should
cover risks not covered by Pillar 1. If SREP and Pillar 1 capital effectively cover all bank risks, then
banks’ discretionary buffers should not be associated with risk. This then prompts the question if
discretionary bank buffers are associated with bank risk.
3. Data and research design
3.1. Pillar 2 and SREP data
This paper exploits Pillar 2 data that banks started reporting more systematically since the pub-
lication of EBA (2015). The research design relies on unique, hand-collected, SREP and Pillar 2
data from 99 individual European banks.
The sample banks all participated at least once in EBA transparency exercises or EBA stress
tests over the years 2012 to 2018. In a first pass, I collected data from the largest banks based
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on Risk Weighted Assets for the year 2017. As some countries host relatively small banks, I
also include data from banks in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Romania, and Slovenia. To
mitigate survivor bias, the sample also includes data from two failed banks (Banco Popular, ABLV
Bank). I excluded subsidiaries of banks to prevent double counting of assets and liabilities. More
importantly, bank supervision focuses on consolidated data, which consequently determines the
prudential information I use. My sample also excludes banks with five observations or less and
car-financing companies such as Renault Cre´dit International. I coded Nordea as a Swedish bank,
as this bank only moved headquarters from Sweden to Finland in 2018, near the end of the sample
period. Data for Portugese bank Novo Banco includes data from its predecessor BES.
Figure 2 shows (next to total capital ratios), in brackets the number of banks and observations
for each country.
[Figure 2 about here.]
I obtained data on the composition of capital, including Pillar 2 and SREP data from annual
and semi-annual reports, Pillar 3 disclosures, registration reports (France), Offenlegungsberichte
(Germany), investor presentations, and press releases. Over the sample period, banks improved
their disclosures of capital requirements significantly. Until 2015, there is large variation in the way
banks report capital requirements. About one in five banks report only the basic capital amounts
and ratios, often in a separate section on capital adequacy in their Pillar 3 report or annual report.
However, about 60 percent of the banks also report expectations or targets regarding capital that
go beyond the bare minimum requirements. Many banks report expectations about capital ratios
derived from stress tests, in particular after the 2014 stress test. These expectations and targets are
likely agreed with the supervisor.
During the early sample years, some banks prospectively refer to the introduction of Basel III
and incorporate its expected requirements into their capital disclosures. For example, Unicredit, in
its 2013 (!) annual report mentions:
“[the] target Core Tier 1 ratio is 9%, in line with the expectations following the in-
troduction of the new regulatory framework. Basel 3 rules have introduced a new
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target of 7% for Core Tier 1 which is equal to the sum of the new minimum and the
conservation buffer. The additional 2% arises from the Group being designated as
Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) and the possible introduction by
national banking regulators of additional buffers.”
Permanent TSB Group refers to a regulatory capital minimum despite the absence of a clear legal
base for such a minimum requirement:
“The Group’s core tier 1 capital ratio at 31 December 2013 is 13.6% (31 December
2012: 18.0%. This compares to a regulatory capital minimum of 10.5%.”
Some national supervisors set minimum standards for Core Tier 1 ahead of the entry into force of
Basel III: Greece, Spain, and Portugal, in 2013, mention a minimum Core Tier 1 ratio requirement
of 9 percent.
For this paper, given that these expectations exceed legal requirements of the CRD, are almost
certainly published with the supervisor’s approval (tacit or explicit), and publicly disclosed as
requirements, I coded these as SREP requirements. Discretionary buffers (‘headroom’, or own
buffers) are then defined as reported CET1 capital minus the summed requirements, including
SREP requirements.
My sample includes banks subjected to the SSM as well as banks from countries not subject
to the SSM: Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. Banks in these countries do not report P2G separately. UK banks, however, report
Pillar 2A or P2A requirements, which are akin to P2R. In addition to the hand-collected data, I use
data from the EBA transparency exercises and stress tests to measure capital under adverse stress
scenarios and to obtain information on non-performing loans and credit growth. I use Refinitiv’s
Eikon and Datastream for market data on equity and Additional Tier 1 capital instruments.
3.2. Analysis of Discretionary Buffers
My identification strategy follows three steps. First, I examine the relation between discretion-
ary buffers, other buffers, and bank characteristics. Based on the results of this analysis, I examine
if any of these characteristics are associated with bank risk. Lastly, as an extension of the second
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step, I examine if banks attempt to mitigate risks by strengthening discretionary buffers after an
adverse stress test result, which is not only a sensible undertaking, it is also required (EBA, 2018).
3.2.1. Discretionary buffers and bank characteristics
My primary variable of interest is the bank’s discretionary buffer: DiscBuffer. This buffer is
the difference between the reported Core Tier 1 or Common Equity Tier 1 ratio and the sum of
all CET1 or CT1 requirements, including disclosed additional and SREP requirements, as well as
disclosed P2R (and P2A for British banks). I exclude P2G capital as well as discretionary capital
requirements for capital other than CET1 or CT1. I estimate the following model:
DiscBufferi,t = β0+β1×SREPi,t +β2×CombBufferi,t +Controlsi,t + εi,t (1)
where I define DiscBuffer as the difference between reported capital and the sum of the require-
ments:
DiscBuffert≤2013 = CT1reported− (SREP+SIB+CCyB+ConsBuffer+CT1BII)
DiscBuffert≥2014 = CET1reported− (SREP+SIB+CCyB+ConsBuffer+CET1BIII)
(2)
Equation (2) reflects the change of the definition of capital of the highest quality from “Core Tier 1”
under Basel II into “Common Equity Tier 1” under Basel III. For years after 2017,DiscBuffert≥2014
is net of the AT1, Tier 2 shortfall.
SREP is the requirement agreed with the supervisor as an outcome of the Supervisory Review
and Evaluation Process. This variable includes P2R, P2A, and similar additional bank-specific
requirements obtained from banks’ disclosures. The combined buffer requirement is defined as:
CombBuffer = SIB+CCyB+ConsBuffer+C(E)T1BII|III , where SIB is any buffer for systemically
importance (globally or domestically), CCyB is the countercyclical capital buffer designed to help
counter pro-cyclicality in the financial system. ConsBuffer is the capital conservation buffer, de-
signed to ensure that banks build up capital buffers outside periods of stress which can be drawn
down as losses are incurred. The last term is the base Basel CT1 or CET1 capital requirement.
Equation (1) uses the following controls: Density, the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets, which
is a measure of risk (Bruno et al., 2015, Melis and Weissenberg, 2019); Size, the log of Total As-
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sets; Z-score, defined by Ciha´k and Hesse (2007), Ayadi et al. (2017) as LR+ROA
σ(ROA) , where LR is the
leverage ratio and ROA the return on assets; Profitability, the return on equity (ROE, in percent);
SSM, a binary value set to one for banks that are subjected to the Single Supervisory Mechan-
ism; Credit Growth defined as the relative change in credit exposure values over one year. The
regression models rely on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation.
I rely on the transitional CET1 ratios, which banks should report under the CRR (EC, 2013b).
Some banks report “fully phased in” capital ratios. These are pro-forma ratios assuming fully
implemented Basel III rules. However, only a subset of the sample banks report these, thus making
like-for-like comparisons difficult.
Regarding the expected coefficients on controls, based on Melis and Weissenberg (2019), I
expect negative coefficients on Density. Larger banks are known to report lower capital ratios, the
associated coefficient on Size value thus should be negative (EBA, 2019a, BCBS, 2019a). Based
on Jensen (2015), Gropp et al. (2016), De Marco and Wieladek (2016), De Jonghe et al. (2019), I
expect negative coefficients on Credit Growth.
Note that Density could be an endogenous variable. To explore the relation between this vari-
able and discretionary bank buffers, I separately run an instrumental variables regression. This
regression uses the geographical latitude of a bank’s headquarters as an instrument for Density.
3.2.2. Discretionary buffers and measures of risk
Using a multivariate regression model, I examine the following measures of bank risk: Z-
scores, yields on subordinated hybrid capital instruments (Additional Tier 1, or AT1), density, and
the price drop during the first weeks of March 2020 due to the COVID-19 price crash:
σi,t = β0+β1×DiscBufferi,t +β2×SREPi,t +β3×CombBufferi,t +Controlsi,t + εi,t (3)
where σi,t is either, Z-score, Yields on AT1, Density, or the COVID-19 price crash. Controls are
Overall Requirement, or the Combined buffer requirement plus the SREP requirement, Size, NPE
ratios, Profitability, and Credit Growth, all as previously defined. The regression models rely on
p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation.
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If higher discretionary buffers decrease bank risk, I expect coefficients values on discretionary
buffers to be positive for Z-scores and share prices, and negative for yields and densities.
3.2.3. Discretionary buffers and stress test results






where DiscBuffer is the discretionary buffer.
I run this regression for all years from 2014 to 2018, even though the EBA runs stress tests in
even years only (2014, 2016, and 2018). The reason to include all years from 2014 to 2018 is that
banks can respond to the stress test results in the year of the test and the year after. There is ample
time to respond. For example, the EBA announced the final methodology for the 2018 EU-wide
stress test on 17 November 2017. The results of the 2018 test were published almost a year later
(2 November 2018). The announcement of the 2020 EU-wide stress test methodology was on 7
November 2019. Likewise, I use the stressed CET1 ratio (CET1Stress) as a regressor for the year
of a stress test and the next, given that this ratio is the two-years out CET1 ratio from the adverse
test scenario.
Equation (4) interacts CET1Stress with SSM (β3) and it uses the following controls: SREP,
the requirement agreed with the supervisor as an outcome of the Supervisory Review and Evalu-
ation Process, CombBuffer’ is the Combined Buffer requirement minus the Stressed CET1, this to
avoid double counting, Density, Size, Profitability, NPE ratio, and Credit Growth, all as previously
defined.
The EBA guidelines on common procedures for the SREP and stress testing require that the
outcomes of the adverse scenario of the stress tests determine and set Pillar 2 Guidance capital,
or P2G (EBA, 2018). In the absence of the exact P2G data, I rely on banks’ discretionary capital
buffers as a proxy for P2G. This is not an unreasonable assumption. Assuming that banks wish
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to retain a constant management (or own) buffer, the stress test results should affect the space not
occupied by the banks’ own management buffer.
The EBA guidelines create the expectation of a negative relation between the discretionary
capital buffers and CET1Stress: a poor stress test result should prompt banks and their supervisors
to increase discretionary capital buffers.
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 show that, since the entry into force of Basel III, reported CET1
ratios have increased significantly. By 2018 these clearly exceed minimum requirements. Figure 2
shows that Total Capital ratios range from 14.7 (PT) to over 22.9 percent (NL), with banks in the
south of Europe reporting lower than average ratios.3
[Table 1 and Figure 3 about here.]
The table shows that the average discretionary buffer is 5.59 percent, significantly higher than
the SREP requirement. Figure 3, however, shows that the distribution and the evolution of both
buffers are distinct. Panel 1 of Figure 3 shows that the SREP requirements have decreased since
2016, whereas the discretionary buffer appears to be relatively constant, with a drop in 2018 be-
cause of the AT1 and Tier 2 shortfall deduction.4 Panel 3 of Figure 3 shows a clear downward shift
of the SREP requirements since 2016. This drop in SREP requirements is about 1.5 percent, and
significant (p-value of 0.00).
Stressed CET1 ratios in Table 1 are the two-years out CET1 ratios reported under the adverse
scenario of the EBA stress test. The stressed ratios are well below required or reported CET1
ratios, with a minimum of −6.42 achieved by Eurobank Ergasias in the 2014 stress test.
3The average capital ratio of the countries shown in Figure 2 is slightly lower than the average reported in Figure 1.
This is because the latter shows the average of bank-year observations, whereas the former shows the ratios calculated
as the sum of total bank capital for all countries divided by the sum of total Risk-weighted assets, also for all countries,
which returns size-adjusted averages. Given that smaller banks are generally better capitalized, the size-adjusted
average Total Capital ratio will be lower than the equally-weighted ratio.
4Panel 1 of Figure 3 also reports the 2019 SREP and aggregate requirements as banks disclosed these via press
releases, investor presentations, or in their (quarterly, semi) annual reports at the end of 2018 and the start of 2019.
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Panel 2 of Figure 3 shows the variation in discretionary buffers, SREP requirements, and the
combined buffer requirements for the sample countries. It is worth pointing out that Swedish
(SE) and Norwegian (NO) capital requirements are relatively high, but the discretionary buffers
are small. This is likely because the prudential supervisors of both countries exclude Pillar 2
requirements from the MDA calculation. Unlike most other EU banks, banks in Sweden and
Norway that not meet expectations of the supervisory review process are thus treated relatively
leniently.
The overall CET1 capital requirements reported in Table 1 vary between 4 percent (2013) to
well over 21 percent (Swedbank 2016 and 2017). The combined buffer requirement reflects the
evolution of the primary Pillar 1 requirements, in particular by the capital conservation buffer. The
maximum value of 13.7 percent originates from DNB bank Group.
Table 1 also shows that bank profitability is weak, with ROE ratios at an average of 3.24
percent, though admittedly these ratios have improved gradually over time. Z-scores have com-
mensurately improved, while NPE ratios have declined marginally. Market metrics show that
PE-ratios have declined since 2016 and that three out of four EU banks report market values below
book equity, thus confirming the vulnerable state of European banks.
Table 2 and Figure 4 present Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman correlations (below diag-
onal) for the main variables. Correlation coefficients worth pointing out are those between densit-
ies, NPE-ratios and Yields on AT1 capital instruments. This indicates that densities act as a proxy
for risk.
[Table 2 and Figure 4 about here.]
Reported CET1 ratios are associated with discretionary buffers, combined buffers, profitability,
Z-scores, and Market to Book ratios. These correlations confirm the literature on bank capital:
Reported CET1 ratios are associated with more resilient and better-performing banks.
Note that SSM banks show negative correlations for reported CET1 ratios, SREP requirements,
combined buffer requirements, and various metrics of performance. This appears to indicate that
EU banks are less resilient than non-SSM banks.
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Lastly, note that the latitude of banks’ headquarters correlates with measures of resilience
(CET1, the combined buffer, profitability, Market to Book), not strongly with discretionary buf-
fers, and okay-ish with densities. For an instrumental variables regression examining the relation
between this variable and discretionary bank buffers, Latitude would thus work as an instrument
for Density.
4. Results
4.1. Discretionary buffers and other buffers
Table 3 presents the results from regression equation (1). The dependent variable is the discre-
tionary buffer and the main regressors are the SREP requirement and the combined buffer require-
ment. I control for density, size, Z-score, profitability, whether the bank is subjected to the SSM,
and credit growth.
[Table 3 about here.]
Model I presents pooled OLS results, whereas models II, III, and V control for fixed and time
effects. Model IV acknowledges the potential causality between densities and discretionary buf-
fers: It could well be thatDensity is an endogenous variable and that this variable and discretionary
buffers are determined by an unobservable variable, e.g. a bank’s risk appetite. To examine this
potential endogeneity issue, I use the latitute of a bank’s headquarters as an instrument for density
(Barth et al., 2005, Chapter 5). Table 2 shows that densities and latitude are somewhat correlated
and that latitude is not correlated with discretionary buffers.
Model V uses logs of buffer ratios × Risk Weighted Assets to assess whether equation (1) is
affected by spurious correlation.
The results of Table 3 confirm that the discretionary buffer is negatively associated with SREP
requirements. The coefficient values on SREP are about −0.85 for models I to IV and −0.54 for
Model V. Moreover, all models indicate this negative association is significant. This is also the
case for the combined buffer requirement. The coefficients on the SREP requirement are negative
while controlling for the main capital requirements (i.e. the combined buffer requirement). SREP
requirements thus almost completely substitute for discretionary buffers.
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Regarding the other control variables, discretionary buffers are negatively associated with dens-
ities, size, and credit growth. They are positively associated with Z-scores.
The negative association between discretionary buffers and densities is significant in all models,
a result that may indicate that low discretionary buffers are associated with elevated risk. The
negative coefficient on size is negative as expected, as larger banks generally report lower capital
ratios. The negative coefficient on credit growth conforms results from studies that show higher
capital ratios affect lending (Jensen, 2015, Gropp et al., 2016, De Marco and Wieladek, 2016, De
Jonghe et al., 2019).
Model IV shows the results of a two-stage instrumental variables approach where latitude is
an instrument for endogenous variable Density. The results of the IV-regression show a negative
association betweenDensity and discretionary buffers. The IV coefficient onDensity is about twice
as high as the associated OLS coefficient, while the other regressors are similar to those of Models I
to III. The bottom row of Table 3 shows the Durbin Score and the Wu-Hausman statistics. Both
reject the null of the variables being exogenous. This justifies the use an instrumental variables
approach. Latitute is also a strong instrument: the F-statistic for joint significance of instruments
is 42.6., well over the rule of thumb value of 10.
The coefficients of Model V, which uses logged un-scaled data for the main coefficients, are
similar to the coefficients of the other models.5 From that I infer that the other models do not suffer
from spurious correlation.
It should also be noticed that these results document a consistent association between discre-
tionary bank buffers and bank characteristics, while the EBA, based on the analysis of Melis and
Weissenberg, claims it cannot make statements about such an association.
From these results I infer that banks’ discretionary buffers appear to compensate for higher non-
discretionary capital requirements. However, this negative association between required capital
and discretionary buffers could be mechanical. As shown by the two bottom panels of Figure 3,
the former may change whereas the latter may be fairly constant. More importantly, the results
in Table 3 show that lower discretionary buffers are associated with measures of bank risk, e.g.
5In Model V, Density is the log of RWAs.
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Z-scores and densities. These results warrant further testing as they could either indicate that
riskier banks choose to lower their discretionary buffers, or that banks with lower buffers choose
to augment their risk appetite to increase profitability.
4.2. Discretionary buffers and measures of risk
Table 4 and Table 5 examine the relation between measures of banks risk and discretionary
buffers. The measures are Z-scores, Yields on Additional Tier 1 capital instruments, densities, and
the price drop during the first weeks of March 2020 due to the COVID-19 price crash.
[Table 4 and Table 5 about here.]
Panel A of Table 4 reveals that discretionary buffers are positively related to Z-scores, which
confirms that more resilient banks have higher discretionary buffers. Similarly, banks that meet a
higher combined buffer requirement show higher Z-scores, as do banks with higher SREP require-
ments. Regarding the other control variables, larger banks have lower Z-scores, perhaps because
they may rely on implicit government guarantees, despite recent evidence to the contrary Berndt
et al. (2019). The coefficients on NPE ratios and Credit growth are inconclusive.
Panel B shows that AT1 yields are negatively associated with discretionary buffers. AT1 yields
are also negatively associated with other capital buffers: the coefficient on the overall capital re-
quirement is negative and significant (p-value of 0.10), albeit that significance weakens after dis-
aggregating the overall capital requirement into the SREP requirement and the combined buffer
requirement. Larger banks report lower yields, a result in line with the results of Panel A. As
expected, the coefficients on NPE ratios are positive.
Panel C shows that densities are lower for banks with higher discretionary buffers, a result
that confirms the findings reported in Section 4.1. The coefficients on NPE ratios are positive,
indicating that banks with poor asset quality have higher densities.
Table 5 examines the effects of a drop in bank share prices during the days from February 19
to March 13, 2020. In this period share prices dropped significantly, about 30%. It is expected
that such a share price crash will have a disproportionate effect on banks with low discretionary
buffers.
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The analysis of the COVID-19 crash regresses the share price drop (×− 1) on Discretionary
buffers, CET1 capital requirements, and previously defined controls. In the absence of up to date
information, the regressors originate from 2018. This may bias my results, however, many of the
regressors are sticky over time.
The results shown in Table 5 confirm my expectations, banks with low discretionary buffers
and low capital buffers are associated with a more severe price shock. The coefficients on Discre-
tionary buffers are negative and significant. Also significant are the coefficients on SSM and NPE
ratios. These results indicate that banks subjected to the SSM and banks with poor asset quality
are particularly affected by the COVID-19 crash.
4.3. Bank’s responses to stress test results
Table 6 shows the responses of banks to the EBA stress tests of 2014, 2016, and 2018. The
sample uses data from the year of the test and the year after. I assume that banks which conform
with the EBA guidelines on SREP and stress testing (EBA, 2018) have an opportunity to respond
to stress tests results during the year of the test and the year after.
[Table 6 about here.]
The first column pair of Table 6 presents results from the full stress test sample. The next two
column pairs examine sub-samples for the years before and since 2016, because the distinction
between P2G and P2R was introduced in that year for SSM banks.
Based on the EBA guidelines on SREP and stress testing (EBA, 2018), I expect the coefficient
on Stressed CET1 to be negative: banks that perform poorly in the stress test should increase
discretionary bank buffers.
The results show negative and significant coefficients on Stressed CET1 ratios, indicating that
banks augment discretionary buffers after a stress test. However, this is different for SSM banks:
the interaction between stressed CET1 and SSM is positive and significant, specifically for the
years since 2016. SSM banks that perform well (poorly) in the stress test report higher (lower)
discretionary bank capital buffers. As such, these results indicate that SSM banks fail to strengthen
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their discretionary bank capital buffer after a poor stress test outcome, which does not dovetail with
supervisory guidelines.
Coefficients on the SREP requirements and combined buffer requirements are generally negat-
ive, consisten with prior results.
It is noteworthy that the coefficient on SSM is negative, in particular for sample years since
2016. Moreover, the coefficent on NPEs is positive, which indicates that banks with higher NPEs
increase their buffers. Many of the controls confirm results reported in the previous subsections,
eg. negative coefficients on size, densities, credit growth, etc.
Table 7 shows a variation of Table 6 using a difference in difference approach. Note that the
first column pair of the table shows regression results using only the countries that participate in
the stress test, whereas the second column pair includes all banks. It uses an indicator (DNS) to
differentiate between banks that do not participate in the EBA stress tests. In addition, Model II,
CET1Stress has a value of zero for observations from banks not participating in the stress test.
These ‘zero’ observations thus complement DNS, which is set to one for these (non-participating)
banks.
[Table 7 about here.]
The results confirm results of the previous table, in particular the coefficients on SSM× Stressed
CET1×Y2016 and SSM×Stressed CET1×Y2018. Both are positive, with the coefficients clearly
significant for 2018.
The coefficient on SSM is negative, in particular for the sample dominated by stressed banks
(−2.51, p = 0.09). The coefficient on stressed CET1 is negative and just significant (−0.30, p =
0.07, −0.42, p= 0.04), indicating that banks with a poor stress test performance do augment their
discretionary buffers. However, the interaction coefficient on SSM× Stressed CET1, offsets the
negative coefficient on stressed CET1. Coefficients values for the year indicators 2016 and 2018
are positive and indicate an increase in management buffers over time, but again, these coefficients
are offset by coefficients on the SSM indicator variables.
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In all, the results of this section indicate that European banks, specifically those that are sub-
jected to the SSM, struggle to build discretionary buffers after a stress test, despite supervisory
guidelines to do so. The struggle to build buffers is more pronounced for the later sample years,
which raises questions about the commitment from both banks and supervisors to rely on P2G
buffers to augment bank capital.
5. Additional tests
Regarding robustness tests, I reran the regressions using various specifications. In all, the
inferences remain the same. Regarding banks’ responses to the EBA stress tests, there is a case for
examining banks’ responses to the projected drawdown of CET1 ratios, e.g. from contemporary
CET1 ratios to the two-years out CET1 ratio from the adverse test scenario. Untabulated results
from regressions of discretionary buffers on the relative CET1 ratio drawdown indicate that the
levels of the stressed CET1 values are more important than drawdowns. This result makes sense,
given that the best capitalized banks will still be well-capitalized after a severe stress test.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines the association between discretionary bank capital buffers, capital re-
quirements, and risk for European banks. The discretionary buffers are banks’ own buffers, or
headroom, being the difference between reported and required capital.
I exploit detailed information of capital requirements that banks started to disclose after the re-
lease of an European Banking Authority opinion in 2015. Using hand-collected SREP and Pillar 2
data from the 99 largest European banks over the years 2013-2019, I show that lower discretionary
buffers are associated with increased bank risk: yields on contingent convertible capital instru-
ments (CoCos, or Additional Tier 1 capital) increase with declining levels of discretionary capital.
Densities (the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets) increase as well, while Z-scores decrease.
Evidence from the March 2020 COVID-19 price crash shows that the price drop is significantly
stronger for banks with low discretionary capital. These results hold, even after controlling for
non-discretionary, required bank capital: Headroom matters.
Regarding the role of discretionary buffers and risk mitigation, an additional examination of
European banks’ responses to stress tests reveals a positive association between discretionary buf-
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fers and stress test results, that is, for banks that are subjected to the Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM). Poor stress test performance is associated with lower discretionary buffers in subsequent
years, whereas supervisory guidance requires banks to use the stress test results to set, arguably
strengthen, discretionary bank capital buffers. The positive association between discretionary buf-
fers and stress test results is particularly strong for SSM banks during later sample years.
In all, my results show a negative association between discretionary buffers (‘headroom’) and
risk and risk mitigation. Consequently, my paper shows further limits of the effectiveness of bank
capital requirements.
Given the poor performance of European banks, my results may indicate that banks and super-
visors acknowledge a trade-off between bank capital and profitability, thus confirming results from
Goel et al. (2019).
Apart from the main findings, my data shows that European banks do disclose capital require-
ments. Many European banks did so before the publication of the EBA opinion that required them
to do so (EBA, 2018). It is noticeable that nine out the 99 sample banks disclose Pillar 2 Guidance
data. Mindful of Akerlof (1970), some of these banks are not necessarily the usual suspects: OP
Financial group, Banca Monte dei Paschi, Banca Carige, Iccrea Banca, Raiffeisen Bank Interna-
tional, BAWAG, KBC, Belfius, and Dexia.
Lastly, it is noteworthy that the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, responding to
the COVID crisis, recognised the importance of headroom and allowed banks to fully use capital
buffers, including P2G (BoE, 2020, ECB, 2020).
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Figure 1: EU Capital requirements and actuals (2018).
28
Figure 2: Total Capital Ratios (2017-2018). In brackets are the number of banks and
the number of observations per country for all sample years.
29
Panel 1: Evolution of capital buffers Panel 2: Capital buffers, by country
Panel 3: SREP density plots Panel 4: Discretionary buffer density plots
Figure 3: Developments of EU Common Equity Tier 1 capital buffers.
30
Figure 4: Correlations: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman correlations (below
diagonal).
31
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
n= 580 Mean Min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 Max StDev
Reported CET1 14.8 5.09 10.3 12.0 13.7 16.2 23.2 42.6 4.72
Stressed CET1 10.1 -6.42 4.08 7.97 9.15 11.8 17.3 35.4 5.15
Overall Requirement 9.05 4.00 4.50 7.91 9.00 10.0 13.6 21.9 2.65
Disc Buffer 5.59 -3.33 0.69 2.67 4.44 7.21 13.4 38.1 5.02
SREP requirement 3.32 0.00 0.00 1.75 3.50 4.51 7.11 12.3 2.22
Combined Buffer req. 5.73 4.00 4.50 4.50 5.13 6.38 10.0 13.7 1.72
Profitability 3.24 -116 -18.2 1.90 5.80 9.03 14.6 39.2 14.0
Leverage ratio 7.01 1.09 3.65 5.18 6.53 8.19 12.5 15.8 2.62
Total Assets 324,355 3,316 12,233 46,393 124,694 364,141 1,445,053 2,250,745 462,131
RWAs 111,478 1,601 7,402 21,272 48,127 109,171 423,891 1,015,743 158,042
Densities 0.07 -0.64 -0.26 -0.05 0.01 0.13 0.71 1.83 0.30
AT1 ratio 0.88 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.31 1.51 3.31 7.19 1.18
Tier 2 ratio 2.47 -0.79 0.00 1.04 2.39 3.38 5.92 9.29 1.86
Z-score 8.55 -0.91 2.36 5.79 8.13 10.7 16.4 25.5 4.26
NPE ratio 6.46 0.00 0.45 1.52 3.01 6.97 26.7 48.4 8.78
Yields on AT1 7.59 0.00 5.00 5.91 6.64 7.58 10.2 47.7 5.51
CoCo (AT1) returns 0.61 -52.5 -11.4 -0.61 0.00 0.22 13.9 72.2 11.3
PE ratio 14.2 0.10 5.77 10.1 12.7 15.6 31.4 49.3 7.82
Market to Book 0.79 0.00 0.23 0.52 0.71 1.03 1.60 2.19 0.42
Credit growth 0.82 -39.9 -13.4 -4.41 0.53 4.65 14.1 135 12.8
SSM 0.78 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.41
Latitude 48.0 35.2 38.0 42.7 48.8 52.1 59.4 60.2 6.38
Means 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Reported CET1 13.2 13.6 14.7 15.3 16.3 15.9
Stressed CET1 8.49 10.8 12.3
Overall Requirement 8.36 8.43 9.24 9.60 9.16 9.49
Disc Buffer 4.83 5.15 5.49 5.69 7.10 5.22
AT1 T2 Shortfall - - - - - 1.14
SREP requirement 3.77 3.61 4.09 3.71 2.51 2.18
Combined Buffer req. 4.59 4.82 5.15 5.89 6.65 7.32
Profitability -0.59 2.20 4.55 2.54 5.50 5.27
Leverage ratio 6.37 6.58 7.06 7.20 7.53 7.29
Total Assets 307,575 329,517 323,058 320,967 323,874 341,722
RWAs 107,001 115,546 114,308 108,690 107,596 115,892
Density 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41
AT1 ratio 0.76 0.72 0.87 0.97 0.94 1.06
Tier 2 ratio 2.54 2.25 2.47 2.56 2.52 2.45
Z-score 3.69 8.97 7.93 8.41 10.3 12.0
NPE ratio 6.60 7.71 7.01 6.02 4.88
Yields on AT1 9.03 8.01 7.10 7.59 7.24 7.38
CoCo (AT1) returns 4.73 1.12 0.21 -3.98 6.31 -4.66
PE ratio 12.7 17.6 16.0 13.4 13.6 12.8
Market to Book 0.65 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.75 0.85
Credit growth - 1.90 0.37 -1.01 1.24 1.70
SSM 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.79
Latitude 48.14 48.02 48.02 48.02 48.10 47.76
The table presents descriptive statistics of variables from 99 European Banks over the year 2012–2018. The table report bank-year
observations from the sample that is used for the regression in Table 3. Reported CET1 is the CET1 ratio reported by banks. Stressed CET1 is
the two-years out CET1 ratio reported under the adverse scenario of the EBA stress test. It has a value of zero for observations from banks not
participating in the stress test. Overall Requirement is the sum of all disclosed CET1 capital requirements: the 4.5%CET1,CT1 requirement,
the conservation buffer, any buffer for systemically importance, the countercyclical buffer, and SREP requirements. Discretionary buffer is
the difference between Reported CET1 and Overall Requirement, net of the AT1 and Tier 2 shortfall. For years after 2017, this buffer is
net of the AT1, Tier 2 shortfall.SREP or SREP requirement is the requirement agreed with the supervisor as an outcome of the Supervisory
Review and Evaluation Process. This variable includes P2R, P2A, and similar additional bank-specific requirements obtained from banks’
disclosures. Combined Buffer requirement is Overall Requirement minus the SREP requirement. Profitability is the return on equity (ROE)
in %. Total Assets and Risk-weighted assets are in thousands of e. Leverage ratio, or LR is Book Equity over Total Assets. RWA is Risk-
Weighted Assets. Densities is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets. AT1 ratio is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets. Tier 2 ratio is the
ratio of RWAs over Total Assets. Z-score is LR+ROA
σ(ROA) , where LR is the leverage ratio and ROA the return on assets, NPE ratio is the ratio
of non-performing loans over total loans. Yields on AT1 is the mean annual yield on Additional Tier 1 capital instruments, PE ratio is the
Price Earnings ratio, for listed banks only. Market to Book is the ratio of the market capitalisation over the book equity value, ibid. Credit
Growth is the relative change in credit exposure values over one year in %. SSM is 1 for banks that are subjected to the Single Supervisory
Mechanism. Latitude is the latitude of the bank’s headquarters. Amounts are in millions of e. All numbers are in percentages, except for
Total Assets, RWA, Densities, Z-score, PE ratio, and Market to Book.
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Table 2: Correlations.
Correlations Reported Discretionary SREP Combined Profitability Z-score Densities Size Credit NPE Yields PE ratio Market SSM Latitude
n= 580 CET1 buffer Buffer Growth ratio on AT1 to Book
Reported CET1 1.00 0.69 -0.05 0.32 0.26 0.24 -0.38 -0.01 -0.05 -0.35 -0.36 -0.02 0.28 -0.23 0.43
Disc Buffer 0.85 1.00 -0.50 0.04 0.13 0.20 -0.23 -0.10 -0.03 -0.16 -0.10 -0.08 0.04 0.07 0.14
SREP requirement -0.01 -0.41 1.00 -0.30 -0.11 -0.28 -0.08 0.06 -0.08 0.11 0.01 0.26 0.03 -0.08 0.03
Combined Buffer req. 0.25 -0.07 -0.11 1.00 0.27 0.40 -0.13 0.12 0.05 -0.36 -0.30 -0.18 0.25 -0.30 0.25
Profitability 0.18 0.13 -0.06 0.21 1.00 0.24 -0.14 0.06 0.35 -0.34 -0.31 0.01 0.60 -0.32 0.38
Z-score 0.19 0.18 -0.25 0.29 0.29 1.00 0.48 -0.27 0.05 0.30 -0.03 0.06 0.16 -0.08 -0.11
Densities -0.39 -0.28 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 0.49 1.00 -0.55 -0.06 0.71 0.37 0.00 -0.19 0.11 -0.52
Size -0.02 -0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.27 -0.51 1.00 0.07 -0.48 -0.05 0.08 0.14 -0.12 0.36
Credit growth -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.31 0.04 -0.06 0.02 1.00 -0.20 -0.12 0.12 0.28 -0.10 0.09
NPE ratio -0.14 -0.08 0.06 -0.23 -0.42 0.28 0.60 -0.39 -0.18 1.00 0.51 0.13 -0.38 0.25 -0.64
Yields on AT1 -0.13 -0.06 0.01 -0.14 -0.04 0.07 0.21 -0.18 -0.06 0.32 1.00 -0.18 -0.32 0.28 -0.26
PE ratio -0.11 -0.17 0.21 -0.18 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.24 -0.13 1.00 0.15 0.08 -0.06
Market to Book 0.36 0.04 0.14 0.38 0.31 0.21 -0.16 0.09 0.06 -0.41 -0.03 0.01 1.00 -0.48 0.49
SSM -0.14 0.08 -0.14 -0.43 -0.21 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.20 0.17 0.15 -0.51 1.00 -0.52
Latitude 0.34 0.13 0.09 0.43 0.28 -0.09 -0.47 0.33 0.06 -0.56 -0.04 -0.14 0.49 -0.52 1.00
The table presents Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman correlations (below diagonal) for the main variables, from 99 European Banks over the year 2012–2018. Reported CET1 is the CET1 ratio
reported by banks, Discretionary buffer or Disc buffer is the difference between Reported CET1 and Overall Requirement. SREP or SREP requirement is the requirement agreed with the supervisor as
an outcome of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process. This variable includes P2R, P2A, and similar additional bank-specific requirements obtained from banks’ disclosures. Combined Buffer
requirement is Overall Requirement minus the SREP requirement, Profitability is the return on equity (ROE) in %, Z-score is LR+ROA
σ(ROA) , where LR is the leverage ratio and ROA the return on assets, Densities
is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets, Size is the log of Total Assets, Credit Growth is the relative change in credit exposure values over one year in %, NPE ratio is the ratio of non-performing loans
over total loans, Yields on AT1 is the mean annual yield on Additional Tier 1 capital instruments, PE ratio is the Price Earnings ratio, for listed banks only, and Market to Book is the ratio of the market
capitalisation over the book equity value, ibid. SSM is 1 for banks that are subjected to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Latitude is the latitude of the bank’s headquarters.
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Table 3: Discretionary Buffers and SREP requirements.
I II III IV V(log)
Discretionary Buffer β p β p β p β p β p
SREP requirement -0.89 0.00 -0.84 0.00 -0.82 0.00 -0.85 0.00 -0.54 0.00
Combined Buffer req. -1.10 0.00 -0.47 0.00 -0.51 0.00 -1.51 0.00 -0.79 0.01
Density -22.4 0.00 -13.0 0.00 -13.9 0.00 -45.1 0.00 0.96 0.02
Size -0.93 0.00 -2.60 0.00 -2.72 0.05 -1.80 0.00 2.15 0.00
Z-score 0.57 0.01 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.09 1.07 0.00 0.06 0.06
Profitability -0.03 0.34 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.14 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.08
SSM -0.88 0.14
Credit growth -1.60 0.02 -0.47 0.02
Intercept 31.1 0.00 45.8 0.00 46.9 0.01 48.6 0.00 -7.13 0.07
Linear model Pooled OLS FE&TE FE&TE IV-regression FE&TE
R
2
0.48 0.47 0.52 0.17 0.24
Obs. 580 580 423 580 367
Instrument for endogenous variable Density: Latitude
Durbin Score (χ2): 24.9 0.00
Wu-Hausman (F): 25.6 0.00
Partial F on the instrument: 42.6 0.00
The table presents regression results from a sample of 99 European Banks over the years 2013–2018. Discretionary Buffer is the difference
between Reported CET1, i.e. the CET1 or CT1 ratio reported by banks, and Overall Requirement, the sum of all disclosed capital requirements: the
CET1 or CT1 requirement, the conservation buffer, any buffer for systemically importance, the countercyclical buffer, and SREP requirements. For
years after 2017, this buffer is net of the AT1, Tier 2 shortfall.
DiscBufferi,t = β0+β1×SREPi,t +β2×CombBufferi,t +Controlsi,t + εi,t
log(DiscBuffer×RWA)i,t = β0+β1×SREPi,t +β2 · log(CombBuffer×RWA)i,t +Controlsi,t + εi,t
(5)
SREP or SREP requirement is the requirement agreed with the supervisor as an outcome of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process. This
variable includes P2R, P2A, and similar additional bank-specific requirements obtained from banks’ disclosures. Combined Buffer is Overall
Requirement minus the SREP requirement, Density is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets (in the log model: the log of RWA), Size is the log of
Total Assets, Z-score is LR+ROA
σ(ROA) , where LR is the leverage ratio and ROA the return on assets, Profitability is the return on equity (ROE) in %,
SSM is one for banks that are subjected to the Single Supervisory Mechanism, Credit Growth is the relative change in credit exposure values over
one year in %, R
2
is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. The regression models rely on p-values that account for
two-dimensional within-cluster correlation. FE and TE are fixed firm (FE) and time effects (TE) respectively.
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Table 4: Discretionary Buffers and Measures of Risk.
I II III IV V
Panel A: Z-scores β p β p β p β p β p
Discretionary Buffer 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.03
Overall Requirement 0.15 0.10
SREP requirement 0.13 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.19 0.02
Combined Buffer req. 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.02
Size -6.76 0.00 -6.77 0.00 -4.13 0.00 -4.33 0.00 -3.48 0.00
NPE ratio -0.04 0.63 -0.01 0.89 -0.05 0.48
Profitability 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00
Credit growth -1.23 0.09
Intercept 85.9 0.00 85.7 0.00 55.5 0.00 58.1 0.00 48.1 0.00
Linear model FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE
R
2
0.34 0.35 0.15 0.40 0.36
Obs. 581 581 429 429 413
Panel B: Yields on AT1 β p β p β p β p
Discretionary Buffer -0.09 0.01 -0.32 0.01 -0.26 0.02 -0.27 0.01
Overall Requirement -0.12 0.10
SREP requirement -0.02 0.85 0.05 0.67 0.07 0.56
Combined Buffer req. -0.60 0.01 -0.36 0.01 -0.38 0.00
Size -0.59 0.79 -1.11 0.03 -0.63 0.02 -0.62 0.03
NPE ratio 0.34 0.14 0.36 0.11
Credit growth 1.84 0.64
Intercept 16.7 0.55 27.2 0.00 17.8 0.00 17.68 0.00
Linear model FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE
R
2
0.007 0.084 0.134 0.138
Obs. 205 205 176 172
Panel C: Densities β p β p β p β p β p
Discretionary Buffer -0.009 0.00 -0.008 0.00 -0.009 0.00 -0.009 0.00 -0.009 0.00
Overall Requirement -0.008 0.00
SREP requirement -0.007 0.00 -0.006 0.00 -0.006 0.00 -0.007 0.00
Combined Buffer req. -0.010 0.00 -0.008 0.00 -0.009 0.00 -0.009 0.00
Size -0.164 0.00 -0.163 0.00 -0.195 0.00 -0.195 0.00 -0.200 0.00
NPE ratio 0.004 0.02 0.004 0.02 0.004 0.04
Profitability 0.0003 0.19 0.0004 0.09
Credit growth -0.0135 0.27
Intercept 2.486 0.00 2.467 0.00 2.811 0.00 2.820 0.00 2.885 0.00
Linear model FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE FE&TE
R
2
0.30 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.37
Obs. 580 580 429 429 413
The table presents regression results from a sample of 99 European Banks over the years 2013–2018. Z-score is LR+ROA
σ(ROA) ,
where LR is the leverage ratio and ROA the return on assets, Yields on AT1 is the mean annual yield on Additional Tier 1 capital
instruments, Density, Densities is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets, Discretionary Buffer is the difference between Reported
CET1, i.e. the CET1 ratio reported by banks. For years after 2017, this buffer is net of the AT1, Tier 2 shortfall.Overall Require-
ment, the sum of all disclosed capital requirements: the base CET1 or CT1 requirement, the conservation buffer, any buffer for
systemically importance, the countercyclical buffer, and SREP requirements. SREP or SREP requirement is the requirement agreed
with the supervisor as an outcome of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process. This variable includes P2R, P2A, and similar
additional bank-specific requirements obtained from banks’ disclosures. Combined Buffer is Overall Requirement minus the SREP
requirement, Size is the log of Total Assets, NPE ratio is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans, Profitability is the
return on equity (ROE) in %, Credit Growth is the relative change in credit exposure values over one year in %, and R
2
is the coef-
ficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. The regression models rely on p-values that account for two-dimensional
within-cluster correlation. All models are panel data models controlling for fixed firm (FE) and time effects (TE).
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Table 5: Discretionary bank buffers and the impact of a large shock.
Dependent variable: share price drop March 2020
β p
Discretionary Buffer -0.012 0.03
SREP requirement -0.016 0.16




Credit growth -0.129 0.05






The table presents regression results from a sample of 50 listed European Banks (2018). The dependent variable is the share
price drop from February 19 to March 13, 2020, multiplied by −1: price declines have a positive sign and price increases a
negative sign. Discretionary Buffer is the difference between Reported CET1, i.e. the CET1 ratio reported by banks and Overall
Requirement, the sum of all disclosed capital requirements: the base CET1 or CT1 requirement, the conservation buffer, any
buffer for systemically importance, the countercyclical buffer, and SREP requirements. For years after 2017, this buffer is net of
the AT1, Tier 2 shortfall.Density is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets (in the log model: the log of RWA), Size is the log of Total
Assets, Z-score is LR+ROA
σ(ROA) , where LR is the leverage ratio and ROA the return on assets, SSM is one for banks that are subjected to
the Single Supervisory Mechanism, Credit Growth is the relative change in credit exposure values over one year in %, NPE ratio
is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans, R
2
is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. The
regression models rely on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation.
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Table 6: Responses to stress test results.
All < 2016 ≥ 2016
Discretionary Buffer β p β p β p
Stressed CET1 (-) -0.42 0.00 -0.26 0.02 -0.53 0.00
SSM -4.78 0.01 -0.81 0.64 -7.64 0.00
Stressed CET1 (-) × SSM 0.47 0.01 0.09 0.64 0.76 0.00
SREP requirement -0.90 0.00 -1.03 0.00 -0.69 0.00
Adj. Comb. Buff. req. -0.82 0.00 -0.89 0.00 -0.74 0.00
Density -10.2 0.00 -10.7 0.00 -9.75 0.00
Size -0.77 0.00 -0.61 0.00 -1.07 0.00
Profitability 0.00 0.92 -0.03 0.33 0.06 0.03
NPE ratio 0.23 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.00
Credit growth -5.00 0.01 -4.56 0.01 -8.86 0.05
Intercept 22.1 0.00 18.8 0.00 26.3 0.00




Obs. 292 153 139
The table presents regression results from a sample of 87 European Banks over the years 2014–2018. Note the sample contains no
observations from Bulgaria, Estonia, and Romania. Discretionary Buffer is the difference between Reported CET1, i.e. the CET1 ratio
reported by banks and Overall Requirement, the sum of all disclosed capital requirements: the 4.5% CET requirement, the conservation
buffer, any buffer for systemically importance, the countercyclical buffer, and SREP requirements. For years after 2017, this buffer is net
of the AT1, Tier 2 shortfall. Stressed CET1 is the CET1 capital requirement from the EBA stress test, two years out, under the adverse
scenario. SSM denotes sample banks that are subjected to the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
DiscBuffer = β0+β1 ·CET1
Stress+β2 ·SSM+β3 ·CET1
Stress ·SSM+β4 ·SREP+β5 ·CombBuffer’+Controls+ ε (6)
SREP or SREP requirement is the requirement agreed with the supervisor as an outcome of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation
Process. This variable includes P2R, P2A, and similar additional bank-specific requirements obtained from banks’ disclosures. Adj.
Comb. Buff. req. is the Combined Buffer requirement minus the Stressed CET1, Density is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets, Size is
the log of Total Assets %, Profitability is the return on equity (ROE) in %, NPE ratio is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans.
Credit Growth is the relative change in credit exposure values over one year in %, and R
2
is the coefficient of determination adjusted for
degrees of freedom. The regression models rely on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation. All models
are panel data models controlling for time effects (TE).
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Table 7: Responses to stress test results - difference in differences.
Dependent variable: Discretionary Buffer
I II
β p β p
SSM -2.51 0.09 -0.87 0.70
Stressed CET1 -0.30 0.07 -0.42 0.04
SSM × Stressed CET1 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.46
Y2016 0.31 0.88 -0.32 0.89
SSM × Y2016 -1.25 0.59 -1.92 0.43
Stressed CET1 × Y2016 0.02 0.93 0.08 0.68
SSM × Stressed CET1 × Y2016 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.28
Y2018 4.50 0.10 0.95 0.71
SSM × Y2018 -9.31 0.00 -4.54 0.05
Stressed CET1 × Y2018 -0.40 0.05 -0.11 0.30
SSM × Stressed CET1 × Y2018 0.73 0.00 0.35 0.06
SREP requirement -0.94 0.00 -0.84 0.00
Profitability 0.01 0.66 0.03 0.11
Density -9.90 0.00 -13.4 0.00
Size -0.73 0.00 -0.64 0.00
Adj. Comb. Buff. req. -0.78 0.00 -0.83 0.00
NPE ratio 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.00
Credit growth -5.41 0.00 -2.97 0.01
Non-stressed bank (DNS) 7.67 0.00





The table presents regression results from a sample Ruropean Banks over the year 2014–2018. Model I contains no obser-
vations from Bulgaria, Estonia, and Romania, reducing the number of sample banks to 87. Model II includes observations of
all 99 banks. Discretionary Buffer is the difference between Reported CET1, i.e. the CET1 ratio reported by banks and Overall
Requirement, the sum of all disclosed capital requirements: the 4.5% CET1 requirement, the conservation buffer, any buffer for
systemically importance, the countercyclical buffer, and SREP requirements. For years after 2017, this buffer is net of the AT1,
Tier 2 shortfall. SSM denotes sample banks that are subjected to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Stressed CET1 is the CET1
capital requirement from the EBA stress test, two years out, under the adverse scenario. SREP or SREP requirement is the re-
quirement agreed with the supervisor as an outcome of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process. This variable includes
P2R, P2A, and similar additional bank-specific requirements obtained from banks’ disclosures. Profitability is the return on equity
(ROE) in %, Density is the ratio of RWAs over Total Assets, Size is the log of Total Assets %, Adj. Comb. Buff. req. is the
Combined Buffer requirement minus the Stressed CET1, NPE ratio is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans, Credit
Growth is the relative change in credit exposure values over one year in %, and Non-stressed.bank or DNS is an indicator variable
set to the value of 1 for observations from banks not participating in the stress test. The reason to include this indicator variable is
that the model now includes all sample observations, not only the observations from banks participating in the EBA stress test. For
Model II, CET1Stress has a value of zero for observations from banks not participating in the stress test. These ‘zero’ observations
thus complement DNS, which is set to one for these (non-participating) banks. R
2
is the coefficient of determination adjusted for
degrees of freedom. The regression models rely on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation.
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